Some interesting comments from Michael Geist concerning the now-infamous Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which is being negotiated in secret by representatives of most developed countries. This piece considers the extent to which states party to ACTA would be required to amend their domestic laws:

most [representatives] have sought to dampen fears by implausibly claiming that ACTA will not result in any domestic changes in their own country. With that in mind, we get:

• the European Union stating “ACTA will not go further than the current EU regime for enforcement of IPRs”
• the USTR maintaining that ACTA will not rewrite US law
• Australia’s DFAT confirming they do not expect to see major domestic changes to Australian law as a result of the ACTA
• New Zealand stating “ACTA will not change existing standards”
• Canadian Industry Minister Tony Clement assuring the House of Commons that ACTA will be subservient to domestic rules

Of course, if all of this is true, skeptics might reasonably ask why ACTA is needed at all. The truth is that ACTA will require changes in many countries that ratify the agreement. The EU Commissioner-designate for the Internal Market, Michel Barnier, recently acknowledged precisely that during hearings in Brussels. Meanwhile, US lobby groups have stated that they view ACTA as a mechanism to pressure Canada into new copyright reforms.

Hmm, fancy that: a document intended not to create any binding obligations, or to effect any changes in domestic law, that is still ratified by hundreds of states? Sounds like just another international instrument! Of course, unlike the universal norms to which other international conventions aspire, ACTA exists to protect highly contested, localised and partisan interests — not exactly an ennobling purpose. It seems far more likely that ACTA will create hard obligations, which — as a matter of international law — signatories will be required to implement within a reasonable period or risk international dispute settlement procedures (or unwanted sanctions from content-exporters or trade blocs).

Meanwhile, Eddan Katz an Gwen Hinze of the EFF have published an excellent paper in the Yale Journal of International Law Online setting out exactly what’s troubling about ACTA and what to do about it:

The ACTA juggernaut continues to roll ahead, despite public indignation about an agreement supposedly about counterfeiting that has turned into a regime for global Internet regulation. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has already announced that the next round of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations will take place in January — with the aim of concluding the deal “as soon as possible in 2010.”

For the rest of us, with access to only leaks and whispers of what ACTA is about, there are many troubling questions. How can such a radical proposal legally be kept so secret from the millions of Net users and companies whose rights and freedoms stand to be affected? Who decides what becomes the law of the land and by what influence? Where is the public oversight for an agreement that would set the legal rules for the knowledge economy? And what can be done to fix this runaway process? …

… [T]he USTR chose to negotiate ACTA as a sole executive agreement. As a result, ACTA will not require congressional advice and approval, which is integral to the constitution’s delicate balance of executive and legislative powers. As staunch a defender of executive privilege as John Yoo once convincingly argued that the limits of executive power to negotiate foreign agreements on intellectual property matters unchecked would deprive the House of its constitutional function. … Sole executive agreements are not meant to be unaccountable. There are in fact systems in place to stop our executive (and private interests) from having untrammeled power to change the law. We’ve outlined four ways that Congress, or an Administration sincere about transparency, could put their house in order.