Internet censorship and the politics of control

Harry Lewis, professor of computer science at Harvard University, has authored an interesting opinion piece on the current state of internet censorship. Broadly, Lewis identifies three sources of censorhip:

  1. State censorship: public agents filter bits for state purposes as they cross national borders (see, eg, the Great Firewall of China, pro-royalist censorship in Thailand, religious censorship in Saudi Arabia, recent unsuccessful attempts in Myanmar, and so on); this form of censorship is relatively easy to identify, but it may extend more broadly — for example, the enforcement abroad of judgments obtained under a foreign state’s defamation laws (Dow Jones v Gutnick an obvious example). Chalk it up to an ongoing love–hate relationship between nation states and the unfiltered internet.
  2. Gatekeeper censorship: Lewis identifies a growing class of content gatekeeps — search engines, popular content-sharing portals (such as YouTube and Facebook) and other large repositories of information (such as Wikipedia — though the wiki model, some have argued, is inherently immune to overt censorship). Google, for example, can ban pages from its index and decide which content is top-ranked in search results (and therefore, for practical purposes, which content is actually read). I could not have practicably discovered the above links on China, Myanmar, Thailand and Saudi Arabia without Google’s blessing. This process is opaque and non-jusiciable. YouTube and Yahoo have faced allegations of censorship for removing controversial political material under the vague mantle of ‘inappropriate content’. Lewis is, at least to some extent, rightly troubled by the fact that we are ‘relying almost exclusively on private companies to help us find the truth, when we cannot know what version of the truth they are showing us’.
  3. Copyright censorship: copyright law increasingly operates as an instrument of censorship — a blunt weapon, in Lewis’ view — by allowing private parties to object to material critical of them. The DMCA takedown regime (and its equivalents abroad) are biased in favour of censors in the sense that content hosts have a strong incentive to comply, whereupon the onus rests on the victim of censorship to rebut the takedown notice. A further factor that contributes to this imbalance is that the copyright owner will often be a large corporation enjoying the advantages of a ‘repeat player’ in copyright litigation over content author ‘one-shotters’.

These problems are far from unique. Nor, as might be assumed, are they confined to Muslim, communist or non-democratic states — just look at the ongoing debate concerning state internet censorship in Australia! (The fact that this is even being seriously considered is troubling enough, let alone the prospect that it might actually be implemented.) Lewis presents a cogent summary of the major issues with characteristic eloquence, drawing on numerous examples from Myanmar, China and the United States’ 2008 presidential election:

Copyright law is the new frontier of censorship. In response to panic in the recording industry about music file sharing, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998. The DMCA seems to have made hardly a dent in the sharing of songs and movies, but it has justified a nasty war between recording studios and the teenagers on whom the industry depends. Other parties are being dragged into the fight. The recording and motion-picture industries are pressuring colleges to screen everything that flows over their campus networks in order to stop the unauthorized delivery of copyrighted songs and movies to students’ rooms.

No one advocates breaking the law, but such screening is inconsistent with academic principles of open communication. Suppose some students were acquiring unauthorized photocopies of textbooks. Would any university respond by opening and inspecting every parcel delivered to a student’s room? And yet such pre-emptive antipiracy measures have become plausible, even on a grand scale. At the urging of the recording industry, the French government is making plans to inspect every Internet communication in the nation before delivery — even though France also affirms people’s basic right, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to “receive and impart information and ideas through any media.” …

The Internet is different from publishing, in fact if not in theory. Were one publisher as dominant as Google or YouTube, its corporate judgments might have a very big impact on the free flow of ideas. And the DMCA protocol presents opportunities for the powerful to suppress speech by spurious invocation of copyright law. In the United States, the Internet is still the “most participatory form of mass speech yet developed,” as a federal judge, Stewart R. Dalzell, wrote in overturning an early Internet-censorship law. For the Internet to remain so, more legislation will be needed to guarantee its openness.

While I don’t necessarily agree with Lewis’ bare assertion that, for the internet to remain an outlet for free speech, ‘more legislation will be needed to guarantee its openness’, it seems clear that current laws and market conditions create considerable potential for abuse — by both private and public censors.

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