From Kuro5hin, an amusing article about Distributed Denial of Existence (or DDoE) attacks. The premise is this: a collective fund is established in a Swiss bank account to which users who dislike another user may contribute. When the fund for a particular disliked user reaches a certain point, a contract assassin is hired through an escrow service to eliminate them. However, the disliked person may contribute to the fund themselves to have it reduced.

I find comparison to distributed denial of service attacks amusing - users who individually would be unable to afford a hitperson can pool their resources to stamp out the voice of the beligerant fool. Alternatively, interested parties fight with their wallets to achieve a common goal; the highest bidder (majority or individual) gets their wish.

The concept is democratically sound: the party that wins will be generally comprised of a greater number of people who will benefit. Although it may allow wealthy individuals to pervert the wishes of the majority by outbidding them, the group has still collectively deprived their nemesis of a substantial amount of money, at little cost to them as individuals. Whatever the outcome, the escrow is a lot richer - depending upon how many friends and how unpopular the person is. Liberty for all, I say!

This paper by Jim Bell on Assassination Politics takes things a step furtgher by introducing an element of chance. People can gamble on whether they think user X will be eliminated within a certain period of time, and contribute their bet to the fund. The author outlines in detail the intricacies of the scheme on the proviso that unpopular individuals are most likely to be dishonest politicians who cannot be dealt with within in the confines of the conventional justice system. While I'm not entirely convinced about Bell's motives, the scheme is certainly peculiar - the ultimate incarnation of economic rationalism.